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1.0 Death by driving: the Scottish landscape 
 
1.1 Framework of offences 
,Q6FRWODQGµKRPLFLGH¶LVWKHXPEUHOODWHUPZKLFKHQFDSVXODWHVWKHVHSDUDWHRIIHQFHV1 of 
murder and culpable homicide. Through this distinction, a range of circumstances in which a 
death can be caused is represented. Since the introduction of the Road Traffic Act 1960, 
causing death by means of a motor vehicle has been treated separately under statutory law, 
and is now specifically provided for by the UK-wide Road Traffic Act 1988. Despite this, 
potential still exists for prosecutions to be brought under the common law2, but the view in 
Scotland, supported by Purcell3, seems to be that any prosecution under common law, even 
in the most serious of cases, can only be for culpable homicide and not murder, unless there 
was a wilful act intended to kill or cause physical injury.  A vehicle can, of course, be used as 
a weapon.4  
 
Part one of the Road Traffic Act 1988 contains the relevant offences which pertain to death 
by driving. The broad offences are: 
  
1. Causing death by dangerous driving5  
2. Causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving6 
 
                                                          
1
 For a discussion about the extent to which these offences are separate, see Ferguson, P., and Mc Diarmid, C., 2014. 
Scots Criminal Law: A Critical Analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. at 9.21. 
2
 As in Brodie v HM Advocate, 1992 S.C.C.R. 487 and McDowall v HM Advocate, 1998 J.C. 194, both discussed by 
Ferguson and McDiarmid., 2014. (n1) at 9.24.1. 
3
 HM Advocate v Purcell, 2008 J.C. 131. Purcell confirmed that the wicked recklessness required for murder requires both 
indifference to the consequences and an act which indicates the DFFXVHG¶VLQWHQWLRQWRFDXVHSK\VLFDOLQMXU\+RZHYHUWKLV
does not sit easily with the outcome in Petto v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 43 where a murder conviction was returned in 
the absence of an obvious intention to cause injury. For an extended discussion of the tension between these 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVVHH0F'LDUPLG&³6RPHWKLQJZLFNHGFRPHVWKLVZD\´WKHPHQVUHDRIPXUGHULQ6FRWV/DZ
Juridical Review 283.  
4
 As was the situation in the high profile case of HM Advocate v Webster, 2011 unreported. For discussion of the facts of 
this see, Webster v HM Advocate[2013] HCJAC 161. The fact that a vehicle can be used as a weapon to assault a victim 
was recognised in Purcell (at para 5).  
5
 Road Traffic Act 1988, s 1. 
6
 µ&DXVLQJGHDWKE\FDUHOHVVRULQFRQVLGHUDWHGULYLQJ¶V% 
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More specifically, the Act now provides for a range of circumstances which death by careless 
or inconsiderate driving might occur: driving whilst unlicensed or uninsured7 or driving whilst 
disqualified8 or driving under the influence of drink or drugs9. 
 
Additionally, there are the related offences of causing serious injury by dangerous driving10 
and causing serious injury by driving when disqualified11. 
 
In criminal law, offences are traditionally understood as being constituted by actus reus (an 
act) and mens rea (a mental state). The actus reus of all these offences is ultimately the 
causing of death. Causation as a concept has been the subject of much intellectual 
discussion amongst criminal lawyers. A simplified understanding may be taken from 
MacDonald12ZKHUHWKHFRXUWVHWRXWWKDWWKHWHVWZDVWZRIROGWKH³EXWIRU´WHVWIDFWXDO
causation), IROORZHGE\DFRQVLGHUDWLRQRISUR[LPLW\OHJDOFDXVDWLRQ,I³WRRUHPRWH´WKHQD
causal link cannot be established. The establishment of the causal link can be assessed on 
the basis of foreseeability. This conceptualisation of causation is evident in tKHFRXUW¶V
assessment of culpability.13 
 
The mens rea of causing death by dangerous driving here is essentially understood in the 
same way as the concept of recklessness, reckless having been traditionally been defined 
XQGHU6FRWV/DZDV³DQXWWHUGLVUHJDUG IRUWKHFRQVHTXHQFHV´14. Section 2A provides that 
driving is dangerous if it falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful 
driver and is dangerous. In assessing this, regard will be had to the circumstances and what 
was within the knowledge of the accused at the time.15 
 
                                                          
7
 S 3ZB, as introduced by the Road Safety Act 2006. 
8
 S 3ZC, as introduced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. 
9
 S 3A, as introduced by the Road Traffic Act 1991. 
10
 S 1A, as introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
11
 S 3ZD, as introduced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. 
12
 McDonald v HM Advocate, 2007 S.C.C.R. 10. 
13
 See for example, Sharp v HM Advocate, 2003 S.C.C.R. 573 where explicit reference is made to what was reasonably 
IRUHVHHDEOHWRWKHDSSHOODQWKDYLQJPDGHWKHGHFLVLRQWRGULYHWRZDUGVDIULHQG¶VRQFRPLQJYDQ 
14
 Transco PLC v HM Advocate, 2004 J.C. 29. 
15
 S 2A(3). 
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To recognise carelessness as a mens rea for criminal conduct is a departure from the 
general common law position that negligence alone will not suffice to invoke criminal 
sanctions.16 7KHFULPLQDOODZ¶VWUHDWPHQWRIQHJOLJHQFH has been the subject of academic 
commentary17, but generally, this is considered to be a lesser form of recklessness, with 
UHFNOHVVQHVVVRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDV³JURVVQHJOLJHQFH´18 In the context of fatal driving 
offences, older Scottish authority has commented specifically that careless driving should not 
be regarded as being akin to reckless.19 The meaning of carelessness is provided for in 
VHFWLRQ=$RIWKH$FWZKHUHLWLVGHILQHGDVGULYLQJZKLFK³IDOOVEHORZZKDWZRXOGEH
expected of a competent DQGFDUHIXOGULYHU´$VVHVVPHQWRIWKLVVKDOOWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKH
³FLUFXPVWDQFHVRIZKLFKKHFRXOGEHH[SHFWHGWREHDZDUHEXWDOVRWRDQ\FLUFXPVWDQFHV
VKRZQWRKDYHEHHQZLWKLQWKHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHDFFXVHG´20 in addition to any inconvenience 
caused by the driving.21 &XQQLQJKDPGLVFXVVHVWKHIDFWWKDWµFDUHOHVVQHVV¶GRHVQRWUHTXLUH
driving in the sense that it created a risk of harm to anyone. Instead, the pertinent question is 
about how far below the required standard of driving someone fell.22 
 
Sections 3ZB, 3ZC and 3A of the Act have been interpreted as strict liability offences, 
meaning all that is required are the conditions, of not being allowed on the road at the time or 
intoxication, to be met.23 This resulted in commentators, such as Cunningham, concluding 
that the principle of causation had been corrupted by section 3ZB (which she also felt had 
IHZUHGHHPLQJIHDWXUHVDQGZDVHVVHQWLDOO\DµEDFNVWRS¶WRVHFWLRQ%DQGVHFWLRQ24 The 
Scottish courts have considered this in more detail in Stewart.25 Stewart had pled guilty on 
the basis of legal advice that section 3ZB was a strict liability offence. After a reference by 
the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission, the Court of Criminal Appeal agreed that 
                                                          
16
 See Ferguson and McDiarmid., 2014. (n1) at 6.17 for discussion.  
17
 Start, F., 2011. Rethinking Recklessness. Juridical Review 163. 
18
 See Ferguson and McDiarmid., 2014. (n1) at 6.17. 
19
 Sharp v HM Advocate, 1987 S.C.C.R. 179. 
20
 S 3ZA(3). 
21
 S 3ZA(4). 
22
 Cunningham, S.K., 2015. Has law reform policy been driven in the right direction? How the new causing death by driving 
offences are operating in practice. 9 Criminal Law Review 711. 
23
 As supported by R v Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552; [2011] Crim L.R 471. 
24
 Cunningham., 2015. (n22). 
25
 Stewart v HM Advocate, 2018 S.L.T. 25. 
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this was an exceptional case and that because RIWKHF\FOLVW¶VDFWLRQVLQGULYLQJLQWRWKHSDWK
RI6WHZDUW¶VYHKLFOHWKHDSSHOODQW¶VGULYLQJKDGQRWFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHGHDWK7KH&RXUWRI
Criminal Appeal confirmed that a driver cannot simply be guilty because they have been 
involved in a fatal accident.26 Instead, it must be shown that the accused has done 
something other than simply put their vehicle on the road. It must be proved that there was 
some minimal contribution to the death, but that this does not need to be the principle cause 
of death. 
 
1.2 Scottish statistics 
The Scottish Government provides a record of the number of people proceeded against and 
convicted of causing death by dangerous driving, causing death by careless driving when 
under the influence of drink and drugs and causing death by careless driving through an 
additional workbook published alongside the Criminal Proceedings in Scotland 2017-18 
statistical bulletin. These most recent publicised statistics pertain to the period 2007-8 to 
2016-17.27  
 
1.2.1 Proceedings and convictions 
For all three offences, the total number of proceedings over this ten year period was 387. 
The total number of persons convicted was 311.28 This represents an 80 per cent conviction 
rate. To contextualise these conviction rates, Scottish Government figures for Criminal 
Proceedings in Scotland, published in 2018, show an average conviction rate (for all crimes 
and offences) of 87.5 per cent between 2007-08 and 2016-17.29 Therefore, with the 
exception of convictions for death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or 
drugs (where the conviction rate is 100 per cent), these rates of conviction appear to be 
broadly similar to the general population of cases.  
 
                                                          
26
 As per R v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56. 
27
 Scottish Government, 2018. Causing death by dangerous driving, careless driving and careless driving when under 
influence of drink/drugs. Available at: < http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Crime-
Justice/Datasets/DatasetsCrimProc/DDCD1617 > [Accessed 28 March 2018]. 
28
 7KHWRWDOIRUWKHWHQ\HDUSHULRGLVQRWSURYLGHGLQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSXEOLFDWLRQEXWWKLVZDVFDOFXODWHGIURPWKH
individual totals provided for each year. 
29
 Sottish Government, 2018. Criminal Proceedings in Scotland 2016-17. Calculated from table 4c. Available at: < 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Crime-Justice/Datasets/DatasetsCrimProc/tab1617CP > [Accessed 9 March 
2018]. 
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More specifically, in relation to death by driving offences, during this ten year period, there 
were 157 proceedings brought for death by dangerous driving, 143 of which resulted in 
convictions (91 per cent). Thirteen proceedings were brought over the ten year period for 
death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs, all of which resulted in 
conviction, as said. Causing death by careless driving alone was the subject of 217 
proceedings over the ten years, (none of which were in the first two years of this recorded 
period), and of these, 155 resulted in conviction (71 per cent conviction rate). The total 
number of proceedings and convictions were at their highest over the ten year period in 
2015-16. 
 
1.2.2 Penalties 
The Scottish Government provides information on four types of penalties issued for three of 
the relevant offences over the ten year period 2007-8 to 2016-17, as illustrated in table 1 
below.  
 
Table 1: Penalties by offence type 
Offence/ 
Type of penalty 
Death by 
dangerous driving 
Death by careless 
driving involving 
drink/drugs 
Death by careless 
driving 
Custody 138 13 24 
Community 3 0 103 
Financial 2 0 25 
Other 0 0 3 
 
On the 24 March 2018 an enquiry was made to the Scottish Government Justice Analytical 
Services concerning the data available on death by driving offences, with a specific enquiry 
made about disqualification data, which was not provided in the material currently published 
by the Government. In response to this enquiry, the Justice Analytical Services provided the 
following data on death by dangerous driving disqualifications on 17 April 2018: 
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Table 2: Disqualifications for death by dangerous driving convictions 
Year/ 
Dis- 
qualification 
period 
2007/
8 
2008/
9 
2009/
10 
2010/
11 
2011/
12 
2012/
13 
2013/
14 
2014/
15 
2015/
16 
2016/
17 
No 
Dis- 
qualification  
1 1 7 2 3 1 0 1 2 2 
2 years and 
less 
0 1 4 10 10 8 3 6 9 8 
2-4 years 0 2 4 7 7 8 5 9 5 7 
4-10 years 10 5 9 3 3 11 7 6 13 7 
Over 10  2 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 
Till past test 13 14 10 12 8 8 9 12 12 7 
Total 26 23 34 35 31 37 25 36 41 31 
 
1.2.3 Limitations of official statistical data  
The data published in relation to proceedings and convictions does not provide details on 
driving offences which specifically cause death. Instead the categories provided are: 
dangerous and careless driving; driving under the influence; speeding, unlawful use of a 
motor vehicle, vehicle defect offences; seat belt offences; mobile phone offences and other 
motor offences. As stated, the information provided on death by driving offences is provided 
as additional data. This additional data is helpful for the purposes of assessing the legal 
landscape, but nevertheless, contains some important limitations. 
 
As mentioned, an enquiry was made to the Scottish Government about available death by 
driving offences data which confirmed that the published data includes all convictions where 
the 'death by dangerous driving' was the only charge/conviction in a case but 
only some convictions where there were multiple convictions (of any charge) in a particular 
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case. As a result of the enquiry made, additional information was provided on the numbers of 
additional charges involved in multi-conviction cases. Table 3 below shows this:  
 
Table 3: Additional charges as part of multi-conviction cases 
2007/
8 
2008/
9 
2009/1
0 
2010/1
1 
2011/1
2 
2012/1
3 
2013/1
4 
2014/1
5 
2015/1
6 
2016/1
7 
0 0 1 3 2 4 2 5 4 1 
 
Whilst this additional data is welcomed, limitations in the data continue to exist. There is no 
way to assign these additional convictions to the same cases, nor with the sentences 
attributed to each case. 
 
As such, it seems appropriate to raise a wider point about how official data tends to 
represent sentenced cases. This issue is not restricted to death by driving offences nor is it 
one which is unique to Scotland. The representation of sentencing practices by official data 
tends to make relatively little distinction between single and multi-conviction cases. How 
should the effective sentence in a multi-conviction case be represented? Where there is 
more than one conviction, a main, or principal, conviction is usually selected by an official 
administrative body (e.g. criminal records office), not by the court. Although in many cases 
this may be thought by the administrative body to be a self-evident decision, it may often be 
less apparent, where, for instance, there is more than one conviction which might appear to 
be of similar gravity. Those selecting the conviction against which the total effective sentence 
is to be recorded may select the conviction which receives the most severe penalty. 
However, this raises its own difficulties. For example, multiple-conviction cases may attract 
different sentences. Sentences may be passed consecutively, concurrently (or in some 
combination of the two), or, in cumulo (covering all offences in a single sentence). This can 
make it difficult for an administrative data body to know what the court perceives to be the 
principal conviction.  The consequence of this complex problem is that the different gravity of 
different cases may not be clearly reflected in the representations made by official data 
about sentencing practices. Furthermore, the comparison between sentences passed for 
cases which may or may not have involved more than one similarly serious conviction is 
questionable. Tata instead suggests the development of a more holistic approach to the 
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recording and representation of sentencing data, ZKLFKZRXOGEHFRPSOHPHQWDU\WRµWKH
SULQFLSDOFRQYLFWLRQDSSURDFK¶VRDVWRFDSWXUHWKHLQWHU-relationship between offences.30 
Therefore, whilst the data provided by the Scottish Government is indicative, it does not 
currently provide a picture of the legal landscape in its entirety. 
 
1.3 Statutory sentencing penalties and review of sentencing in the Scottish Court of 
Criminal Appeal 
The maximum sentence which can be imposed in this context has been prescribed by 
Parliament. For death by dangerous driving, the most serious of the offences contained 
ZLWKLQWKH$FWWKLVLV\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZLWKDPLQLPXPGLVTXDOLILFDWLRQSHULRGRI
two years and compulsory re-test. 
 
There is greater difference of sentencing in the context of causing death by careless or 
inconsiderate driving. Where this is caused by drink or drug intoxication (section 3A), the 
PD[LPXPSHQDOW\LV\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZLWKDPLQLPXPGLVTXDOLILFDWLRQSHULRGRIWZR
years with a compulsory extended re-test required.   
 
For death by careless or inconsiderate driving under section 2B, the maximum penalty is five 
\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZLWKDPLQLPXPGLVTXDOLILFDWLRQSHULRGRIPRQWKVDQGGLVFUHWLRQDV
to the issue of a re-test.  
 
For causing death by driving whilst unlicensed or uninsured (section 3ZB) the maximum 
SHQDOW\LVWZR\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZLWKDPLQLPXPGLVTXDOLILFDWLRQSHULRGRIPRQWKVDQG
discretion as to the issue of a re-test.  For causing death by driving whilst disqualified 
VHFWLRQ=&WKHPD[LPXPSHQDOW\LV\HDUV¶ imprisonment with a minimum 
disqualification period of two years with a compulsory extended re-test required.  For causing 
VHULRXVLQMXU\E\GULYLQJZKLOVWGLVTXDOLILHGVHFWLRQ='WKHPD[LPXPSHQDOW\LVIRXU\HDUV¶
imprisonment with a minimum disqualification period of two years with a compulsory 
extended re-test required.   
 
                                                          
30
  Tata, C., 1997. Conceptions and representations of the sentencing decision process. 24(3) Journal of Law and Society 
395. These issues were also explored by the Scottish Sentencing Information System project which concluded that official 
data derived from Scottish Criminal Records Office would not provide sufficiently meaningful information to be useful to 
inform and assist sentencing practice. See for example: Tata, C., and Hutton, N., 2003. Beyond the Technology of Quick 
Fixes: Will the judiciary act to protect itself and shore up judicial independence? 16(1) Federal Sentencing Reporter 67. 
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A review of Scottish sentencing appeal cases was carried out. 
 
1.3.1 Death by careless or inconsiderate driving 
 
It would appear that much like culpable homicide, in practice, sentences of 12 years may be 
considered as the upper end of what is available for an accused who is found guilty of the 
most serious of the death by careless driving- those driving under the influence of drink or 
drug.31 The recent case of Grant involved a succHVVIXODSSHDODJDLQVWVHQWHQFHIRU\HDUV¶
imprisonment.32  This period of imprisonment was reduced to seven years and four months 
on the basis that it was excessive, especially in the context of a recognised mitigation (the 
DSSHOODQW¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKthe deceased). On this point, reference was made to the 
guidelines set by the Sentencing Council for England and Wales which advises a starting 
SRLQWRIHLJKW\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWVHHVHFWLRQEHORZGrant also involved a conviction 
under section 3ZB because he was unlicensed and uninsured at the time of the collision.33  
 
Discussion about the limits of sentencing in the context of section 3ZB can also be seen in 
FlemingZKHUHDVHQWHQFHRIILYH\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGHLJKW\HDUV¶GLVTXDOLILFDWLRQZDV
substituted for a five year imprisonment and disqualification for six years and eight months.34 
The Court of Criminal Appeal agreed that the sentencing judge had been right to consider 
that this case fell between the categories set out by the Sentencing Council for England and 
Wales in respect of careless driving due to momentary inattention (with aggravating factors) 
and careless driving falling short of dangerous (see section 2.0 below).  
 
                                                          
31
 See for example the case of Hanlon v HM Advocate, 2000 G.W.D. 4-ZKHUHDVHQWHQFHRIQLQH\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQW
was substituted for a seven year sentence for a culpable homicide which included violent circumstances and Crabb v HM 
Advocate, 1999 G.W.D. 20-940 where an appeal against a ten year sentence for a culpable homicide was refused in what 
ZDVGHVFULEHGDVD³WHUULEOHRIIHQFH´$OWKRXJKLQWKHPRUHUHFHQWFDVHRIHM Advocate v Colquhoun, 2012 unreported, 
6XVDQ&ROTXKRXQUHFHLYHGDVHQWHQFHRIQLQH\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZLWKDQH[WHQVLRQSHULRG of three years for killing her 
partner. In addition to a charge of culpable homicide, however, Colquhoun was also convicted of attempting to defeat the 
ends of justice. Sentencing statement. Available at: < http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/8/968/HMA-v-SUSAN-JOAN-
COLQUHOUN > [Accessed 8 March 2018]. 
32
 Grant v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 11. Grant had pled guilty to charges under s 3A(a)(b) and s 3ZB. 
33
 HM Advocate v Roulston, 2006 J.C. 17 also involved an appeal against sentencing under s 3A. Here, it was held a 
GLVFRXQWRISHUFHQWZDVWRROHQLHQWDQGWKUHH\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZDVLQFUHDVHGWRVHYHQDORQJVLGHDWHQ\HDU
disqualification period.  
34
 Fleming v HM Advocate, 2013 S.C.L. 386. 
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Likewise, Rai provides insight into what is considered appropriate sentencing in the context 
of section 3ZB. Here the offender was both disqualified and uninsured, had previous 
motoring convictions, had been working at the time of the collision and was driving on the 
motorway at night -all of which were considered aggravations. A period of 12 months and 18 
PRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWIRUHDFKFKDUJHZDVVXEVWLWXWHGIRUVHQWHQFHVRIQLQHDQGPRQWKV¶
imprisonment due to the application of a sentencing discount.35 This was also a case which 
considered the issue of causation in more detail, given that his car was amongst a number of 
vehicles involved in the collision which resulted in death.36 
 
A review of Scottish Court of Criminal Appeal decisions on sentencing in respect of death by 
careless driving show that appeals are as likely to be from the Crown on the basis of lenient 
sentencing as from an appellant claiming excess. For example, in McKay, the Crown 
appealed against a community service order of 240 hours and one year disqualification for a 
conviction under section 2B. This appeal was allowed, with a four year disqualification 
substituted.  Despite the appeal being allowed, it was recognised that a community service 
order can be appropriate in circumstances such as this, where the respondent had suffered 
emotional and psychological consequences, that is to say the use of community service as a 
punishment did not automatically render the sentence unduly lenient. The Court commented 
WKDWWKHUHH[LVWVD³VSHFWUXP´RIQHJOLJHQWGULYLQJUDWKHUWKDQFDWHJRULHVZKLFKFDQEHNHSW
in mLQGGXULQJWKHFRXUW¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIFXOSDELOLW\37  
 
An example of an unsuccessful Crown appeal under section 2B can be seen in McCourt 
where it was considered that a community service order amounting to 300 hours unpaid 
work (to be carried out over a year) alongside a five year disqualification (with re-test 
requirement attached) was unduly lenient. This appeal was refused on the basis that the 
sentence had correctly been directed towards the culpability of the accused and not 
causation (on the issue of a cyclist not wearing a helmet).38 Importantly, the respondent had 
a previous conviction for causing death by reckless driving obtained in 1986, which had 
UHVXOWHGLQPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGGLVTXDOLILFDWLRQIRUDSHULRGRIWHQ\HDUV 
                                                          
35
 Rai v HM Advocate, 2012 S.C.L. 283. 
36
 See also HM Advocate v Kelly, 2009 G.W.D. 31-527 where concurrent sentences for convictions under s 3ZB and 2B 
ZHUHUHGXFHGWRQLQHPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWIURPDQGZHHNV¶LPSULVRQPHQWIURP36). 
37
 HM Advocate v McKay, 2011 S.L.T. 250. 
38
 HM Advocate v McCourt, 2014 J.C. 94. 
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1.3.2 Death by dangerous driving 
Likewise, Crown appeals are significant in the context of Scottish death by dangerous driving 
FDVHV7ZRXQVXFFHVVIXODSSHDOVKDYHERWKEHHQFDWHJRULVHGE\WKHWULDOMXGJHVDVµOHYHO
WZR¶VHULRXVQHVVLQUHIHUHQFHWRWKH6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLOIor England and Wales, see 
section 2.0 below), are McKeever and Milligan. In both the Court warned against rigid 
application of English guidelines.  
 
McKeever LQYROYHGDVHQWHQFHRIVL[\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWGLVFRXQWHGWRIRXULQWKHFRQWH[W
of alcohol impairment. The court noted that although this was perhaps generous, it was not 
unduly lenient.39 In MilliganDVHQWHQFHRIVL[\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGHLJKW\HDUV¶
disqualification (with re-test condition) was upheld, with it being noted that the trial judge had 
heard the evidence and was in a better position than the appeal court to assess sentence.40  
 
In the context of death by dangerous driving, examples of successful appeals by the Crown 
can be seen in the case of Stalker, ZKHUHPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZDV recognised as 
unduly lenient where the circumstances of the fatality included the respondent racing other 
drivers41, and MacphersonZKHUHDSHULRGRIPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZDVVXEVWLWXWHGIRU
one of four years on the basis of previous motoring convictions, being under the influence of 
cannabis at the time of the collision and having modified the car.42  
 
Obviously it is appeals from convicted drivers which ultimately address the issue as to what 
is to be considered an excessive sentence in respect of a death by dangerous driving 
FRQYLFWLRQ7KH&RXUWRI&ULPLQDO$SSHDOKDVFRQVLGHUHGFODLPVWKDWVHYHQ\HDUV¶
imprisonment was excessive in two cases. The first was, Sharp, where the appellant had 
EHHQLQYROYHGLQGULYLQJDWVSHHGWRZDUGVDIULHQG¶VRQFRPLQJYan, resulting in the injury of 
three pedestrians and death of one. Here the appeal was refused on the basis that the 
consequences (of losing control) were reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances.43 
Similarly, a sentence of seven years was considered in Vieregge, where speeding had 
                                                          
39
 HM Advocate v McKeever, 2016 S.C.L. 564. 
40
 Milligan v HM Advocate [2015] HCJAC 84. 
41
 HM Advocate v Stalker, 2004 S.L.T. 292. 
42
 HM Advocate v Macpherson, 2005 S.L.T. 397. 
43
 Sharp v HM Advocate6&&5+HUHWKHVHYHQ\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZDVVSHFLILFDOO\WREHFDUULHGRXWLQD
young offender institution. 
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resulting in the death of four people, but it had been argued that the accused was of 
previously good character and suffering from genuine remorse. Here, the appeal was 
allowed on the basis of the lack of aggravating factors.44  
 
Other considerations of what is excessive in the context of death by dangerous driving have 
taken place in cases such as Lynn, which involved the death of three individuals and injury of 
a fourth..45 Here it was held that although the case did warrant a deterrent sentence given 
the high speeds involved, ultimately the trial judge had miscategorised the case as one at 
the extreme end of seriousness. Similarly, in Wright and Dingwall, appeals against excessive 
sentence were allowed and sentences reduced accordingly. In WrightILYH\HDUV¶
imprisonment and a ten year disqualification was substituted with a five year disqualification 
(but no change to imprisonment period) on the basis that, although the trial judge had been 
right to disregard the fact that the deceased was not wearing a seatbelt, no aggravating 
factors existed.46 In DingwallILYH\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGWHQ\HDUV¶GLVTXDOLILFDWLRQZDV
VXEVWLWXWHGIRUIRXU\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGVHYHQ\HDUV¶GLVTXDOLILFDWLRQRQWKHEDVLVWKDWD
starting point of ILYH\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZDVH[FHVVLYHDQGWKDWDGLVFRXQWPXVWDOVREH
DSSOLHGWRUHIOHFWWKHJXLOW\SOHDZKLFKZDVWHQGHUHG+HUHWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VVSHHGKDG
been excessive (80 mph in a 40mph zone). The case analysis notes that in addition to the 
mitigating factors already taken into account by the sentencing judge (presumably the fact 
that the deceased was his girlfriend47, since this is mentioned), the appellant presented a low 
risk of reoffending and was supported by his family and people from the local community.48 
 
1.3.2 Causing serious injury by dangerous driving 
There appears to be only one Scottish case which has considered the issue of sentencing 
for a section 1A offence in a Scottish context. In Dulas the accused had been sentenced to 
27 (discouQWHGIURPPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGZDVGLVTXDOLILHGIRUDSHULRGRIILYH
                                                          
44
 Vieregge v HM Advocate, 2003 S.C.C.R. 689. Here the seven year sentence was substituted for one of five and a half 
years. 
45
 Lynn v HM Advocate, 2009 S.C.L. 324. Here both accused had pled guilty; the first was sentences to 10 years and two 
PRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGWKHVHFRQGWRHLJKW\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWERWKZHUHGLVTXDOLILHGIURPGULYLQJ7KHVHZHUH
substituted for sentences of seven years and eight months and six years. 
46
 Wright v HM Advocate, 2007 J.C. 119. 
47
 It is not elucidated with specificity whether the death of the girlfriend was considered mitigation in its own right or whether 
the mitigating factor was the presumed psychological affect her death had on him. 
48
 Dingwall v HM Advocate, 2005 S.C.C.R. 700. 
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years. He appealed on the grounds of the custodial punishment being excessive.49 The 
Court of Criminal Appeal recognised that the sheriff had been correct to pass a custodial 
sentence, given the impact on the victim (including post-traumatic stress and limited 
employment ability following the offence) and in particular the disabilities he had suffered as 
DUHVXOWRIWKHRIIHQFHEXWWKDWDVDVWDUWLQJSRLQWWKUHH\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQt was excessive 
where there were no aggravating factors. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed and a 
VHQWHQFHRIPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZDVVXEVWLWXWHG 
 
The fact that no sentencing guideline exists for the new offence has been the subject of 
discussion in England. In R v Dewdney50 it was stated that the death by dangerous driving 
guidelines were helpful, but that given the statutory maximum sentence for an offence under 
section 1A compared to the offence of dangerous driving, it was necessary to apply a 
³GHJUHHRIFRPSUHVVLRQ´LQWKHVHQWHQFHVDYDLODEOHWRWKHFRXUWWRUHIOHFWWKHGLIIHUHQWW\SHV
of dangerous driving and consequences which could arise from a section 1A offence. Here, 
the court commented that it was not helpful to consider the worst imaginable type of case 
that would attract a sentence at the maximum level. Instead, it was more realistic to identify 
broader bands of conduct that would represent the most serious kind of offending within the 
ambit of the offence. In Dewdney specifically, it was held that a high degree of culpability 
existed due to the excess alcohol present at the time of the offence, his previous convictions 
(including those for dangerous driving) and the fact that the offender had ignored warnings 
from his passengers about the character of his driving. As such, the renewed application was 
UHIXVHGDQGLWZDVKHOGWKDWDVHQWHQFHRIPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGWKUHH\HDUV¶
disqualification (with the requirement to pass an extended text) was not excessive.   
 
2.0 Sentencing guidelines 
The Road Traffic Act 1988 is UK wide legislation. Guidelines have been provided in relation 
to the Act by the Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The guidelines are sequentially 
structured and consider the offences of death by dangerous driving, death under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs, death by careless driving and death by driving where 
disqualified, uninsured or unlicensed. As mentioned above, these guidelines have been 
                                                          
49
 Dulas v HM Advocate [2016] HCJAC 91. 
50
 R v Dewdney [2014] EWCA Crim 1722; [2015] 1 Cr App R (S) 5. 
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referred to in Scottish decision-making on sentencing.51 As such, they have particular 
relevance in a Scottish context. 
 
2.1 Sentencing methodology 
The sentencing methodology provided by the Sentencing Council for England and Wales is 
as follows52: identify dangerous offenders (those who pose a significant risk of harm), identify 
an appropriate starting point based on the facts of the case, consider any aggravating factors 
present, consider mitigatory factors present, apply a reduction for a guilty plea under the 
approach set out in earlier Sentencing Council guidelines53, consider whether an ancillary 
order is appropriate, consider the principle of totality (i.e., is the sentence proportionate and 
balanced) and then provide reasons for the sentence which has been decided. Where the 
sentence imposed is outside the range provided in the guidelines, detailed reasons must be 
provided for this.  
 
Although this appears to be a highly directive methodology, this decision-making process is 
H[SOLFLWO\UHFRJQLVHGDV³IOXLG´DQGUHTXLULQJWKHVWUXFWXUHGH[HUFLVHRIGLVFUHWLRQ54 
 
2.2 Determinants of seriousness 
The starting point for sentencing is an assessment of culpability. To assess culpability 
generally what must be considered is evidence of the quality of driving involved and the 
degree of foreseeability of harm. The Sentencing Council for England and Wales distinguish 
between factors intrinsic to the quality of driving- µGHWHUPLQDQWV¶- and aggravating factors.  It 
is noted there are varying degrees to which an aggravating factor can be present and it is the 
trial court which is best placed to judge the impact of this on sentencing.  
 
Determinants identified by the Sentencing Council are: awareness of risk, factors of 
impairment (including drugs or alcohol), speed, culpable behaviour (e.g. aggressive driving 
                                                          
51
 Sentencing Council, 2008. Death by Driving: Definition Guideline. [pdf] Available at: 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/web_causing_death_by_driving_definitive_guideline.pdf> 
[Accessed 8 March 2018]. 
52
 Sentencing Council, 2008. (n51) at p 9. 
53
 Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2007. Reduction in Sentence for an Guilty Plea: Definitive Guideline. [pdf] Available at: < 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_-Revised_2007.pdf  
> [Accessed 22 March 2018]. 
54
 Sentencing Council, 2008. (n51) at p 9. 
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or mobile phone use) and the victim (e.g. whether s/he was a vulnerable road user). They 
also distinguish between ordinary distractions and gross avoidable distractions which divert 
attention for longer periods.  
 
An example of an aggravation is if more than one person is killed (although it is noted that 
this in itself may give rise to separate charges being brought, with concurrent sentences 
attached). Previous convictions for motoring offences will also be considered as 
aggravations as will irresponsible behaviour such as failing to stop at the scene or trying to 
suggest that a victim was responsible for the collision. 
 
2.3 Mitigating factors 
The assessment of seriousness is also informed by the presence of any mitigatory factors. 
Mitigatory factors include the effect of the offence on the offender (physical and emotional) 
and any relationship with the victim(s) of the offence. Remorse is considered as personal 
mitigation, as is providing assistance in the aftermath of the offence. However, not providing 
assistance is not considered a determinant of seriousness since it is recognised that there 
may be factors related to this inaction, such as stress following the incident. On the issue of 
a good driving record, it is said that this does not automatically provide mitigation, but may 
be considered if for example, the good driving record had an input into public service (e.g., 
DPEXODQFHGULYLQJ/DFNRIGULYLQJH[SHULHQFHDQGµ\RXWK¶DUHH[SOLFLWO\QRWFRQVLGHUHGWREH
mitigatory.55  
 
Where intoxication is part of the offence, taking drink or drugs unwittingly will also be 
considered as a mitigation. Under section 2B, it will also be taken into consideration whether 
the victim or a third party contributed to the commission of the offence. Lastly, where the 
context of the offence includes being unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured, the court can 
consider whether a genuine emergency had arisen, falling short of a defence, and whether 
the offender genuinely believed they were legally able to drive at the time of the offence. 
 
 
 
                                                          
55
 Sentencing Council, 2008. (n51) at p 6. 
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2.4 Levels of seriousness 
Decision-making in sentencing in England and Wales is informed by the level of seriousness. 
In relation to section one, three levels of seriousness are provided for in the guidelines, with 
each providing a sentencing range.  
 
Level one represents the most serious cases which would be decided upon in this context. 
Level one cases might involve prolonged bad driving and/or gross impairment and/or group 
of determinants.  For example, cases which involve multiple deaths or a very bad driving 
record. HHUHWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUVHQWHQFLQJLVHLJKW\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGWKHVXLWDEOH
range is between seven and 14 years. 
 
At level two, the offender is considered to pose a substantial risk to society. Such cases may 
involve excessive speeding, including racing, and impairment. The starting point for 
VHQWHQFLQJLVILYH\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDWOHYHOWZRDQGWKHUDQJHLVEHWZHHQIRXUDQGVHYHQ
years. 
 
Level three offenders are considered to pose a significant risk to the public. Cases within this 
category may involve speeding or tiredness. At level three, the starting point for sentencing 
LVWKUHH\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGWKHDSSURSULDWHUDQJHLVEHWZHHQWZRDQGILYH\HDUV 
 
Under section 2B, the nature of the offence is divided into three categories: careless or 
inconsiderate driving not falling far short of dangerous driving, other cases of careless or 
inconsiderate driving and careless or inconsiderate driving arising from momentary 
inattention with no aggravating factor. For the first category, the starting point in sentencing 
LVPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDQGWKHUDQJHLVEHWZHHQZHHNVDQGWKUHH\HDUV)RUWKH
VHFRQGFDWHJRU\WKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWLVZHHNV¶LPSULVRQPHQW7KHUDQJHKHUHVWDUWVDWD
community order (high) but can go to two years imprisonment. The starting point for the last 
category is a community order (medium) and the range is between a low and high 
community order.  
 
This is similar to the framework provided for an offence under section 3ZB. The offence is 
subcategorised into cases where: (1) the offender was disqualified from driving or was 
unlicensed or uninsured plus two or more aggravating factors from the list provided. 
6HQWHQFLQJKHUHVWDUWVDWPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZLWKDUDQJHRIEHWZHHQZHHNVDQG
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WZR\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQW7Ke offender was unlicensed or uninsured plus at least one 
DJJUDYDWLQJIDFWRUIURPWKHOLVWSURYLGHG7KHVWDUWLQJSRLQWKHUHLVZHHNV¶FXVWRG\DQG
WKHUDQJHLVDFRPPXQLW\RUGHUKLJKXSWRZHHNV¶LPSULVRQPHQW7KHRIIHQGHUZDV
unlicensed or uninsured and no aggravating factors are present. The starting point here is a 
community order (medium) and the range within the community orders which can be offered 
are between low and high. 
 
For section 3A, the previous categories of careless driving are subdivided by the amount of 
alcohol which is found in the offender. 
 
2.5 Use of guidelines in a Scottish context 
It is clear in reviewing Scottish cases on causing death by driving, that the factors influencing 
sentencing are similar to those provided by the Sentencing Council for England and Wales, 
and indeed, explicit reference is often made to these guidelines.56 However, the exact 
influence of the guidelines appears not to be definite. The Court of Criminal Appeal has 
engaged in specific discussion about the level of seriousness, as categorised by the 
6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLO¶VJXLGHOLQHV57 and the fact, for example, that the guidelines do not 
demand that the disqualification length be matched to the imprisonment period58. Yet despite 
this, the Court of Criminal Appeal has stated explicitly that strict adherence to the English 
sentencing guideline is to be avoided59 and that the Scottish approach to sentencing is 
³UDWKHUOHVVIRUPXODLFWKDQWKH(QJOLVKVHQWHQFLQJJXLGHOLQHV´60  
 
Certainly, an examination of older appeals cases shows that the Scottish courts have not 
always adopted the principles now articulated (and set out in the guidelines formally since 
2008). This is particularly exemplified in death by careless driving cases such as Seaton, 
where it was held that WZR\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWZDVQRWH[FHVVLYHJLYHQWKHJUDYH
FRQVHTXHQFHVZKLFKDURVHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHDSSHOODQW¶VFDUHOHVVGULYLQJGHVSLWHWKH
devastating effect the incident had had on him and the fact that he had lost his job as a 
                                                          
56
 See for example Wright v HM Advocate, 2007 J.C. 119. 
57
 For example in Neil v HM Advocate [2014] HCJAC 67 where it was held that a level one categorisation was inappropriate 
and that level two best represented the facts. 
58
 Geddes v HM Advocate, 2015 S.L.T. 415. 
59
 HM Advocate v McKeever, 2016 S.C.L. 564. 
60
 Milligan v HM Advocate [2015] HCJAC 84, Lord Menzies at 5. 
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result61, and in Sharp62 where a £250 fine and one year disqualification period had been 
imposed, but the period of disqualification was reduced to six months on the basis that the 
death of the passenger should not have been regarded in sentencing. 
 
As regards the use of the English sentencing guidelines in a Scottish context,63 Brown re-
emphasised that other authorities are never definitive in sentencing in Scottish courts64 and 
that in the context of sentencing death by driving offences, Scottish sentencers have been 
invited to take consideration of sentencing in other Scottish offences, for example culpable 
homicide.65  
 
More recently, Brown has also provided case comment on the cases of Brierley v HM 
Advocate66 and Burke v Laing67 which are concerned with section 1A of the 1988 Act- where 
driving causes serious injury but not death. In Burk, the court considered that English 
guidelines form a relevant consideration in Scotland if approached with care68 and in Brierley 
it was noted that the Sheriff Appeal Court was unaware of any Scottish decision which had 
considered section 1A of the 1988 Act. 
 
3.0 Assessment of culpability 
Levels of culpability are determined, in part, by the mens rea of the offence. Typically, in 
criminal law, crimes of intent are considered to suggest the highest level of offender 
FXOSDELOLW\,QWKLVFRQWH[WµGDQJHURXV¶µUHFNOHVV¶GULYLQJXQGHUVHFWLRQDUHWKRVHZKLFK
will be considered most serious in terms of culpability. Carelessness as a form of mens rea 
is, therefore, less serious and implies less culpability.  Interestingly, the penalties associated 
with careless driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (section 3A) suggest an 
                                                          
61
 Seaton v HM Advocate, 1999 G.W.D. 14-664. 
62
 Sharp v HM Advocate, 1987 S.C.C.R. 179, following McCallum v Hamilton, 1986 J.C. 1 regarding the death of the victim. 
63
 Brown, G., 2015. Case Comment: The proper use of English sentencing guidelines and further observations on the guilty 
plea discount-Geddes v HM Advocate. 136 Criminal Law Bulletin 3. 
64
 As per Deeney v HM Advocate, 2015 S.C.L. 329. 
65
 Neill v HM Advocate [2014] HCJAC 67. 
66
 Unreported 8 November 2016 (HCT). 
67
 [2016] SAC (Crim) 31. 
68
 Brown, G., 2017. Case Comment: Causing serious injury by dangerous driving (s. 1A 1RTA 1988). 146 Criminal Law 
Bulletin 7. 
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assessment of culpability which sits closer to causing death by dangerous driving, than 
causing death by careless driving (section 2B). 
 
In strict liability offences, such as those contained within the Road Traffic Act 198869, it is not 
necessary to prove culpability in order to obtain a conviction. However, culpability must be 
assessed against the harm which has been caused, the presence of aggravating factors and 
presence of factors in mitigation. This will be considered in more detail below.  
 
3.1 Culpability and harm 
The Sentencing Council for England and Wales make clear that it is because this category of 
offences contains harm to someone (specifically, death) that culpability is the starting point in 
terms of sentencing.70 In the cases of the unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured drivers, 
culpability arises just from being on the public road in the vehicle; that is to say, culpability is 
linked to the prohibition rather than the driving itself.71  
 
For Roberts et al, the level of culpability involved in death by driving offences is not usually 
associated with such serious harm, making it a particularly interesting category of criminal 
offences.72 They cite previous studies of public attitudes which support this, such as 
Canadian research conducted by Doob and Roberts which found that drinking and driving 
was only perceived to be serious to the extent that it resulted in actual harm.73 For them, this 
study particularly emphasised the fact that loss of life often eclipses level of culpability in 
public perceptions, since in the example Doob and Roberts used with their participants, it 
was made clear that the driver had no culpability, but that despite this, punitive sentencing 
recommendations were nevertheless made by participants in the study.74 
 
 
                                                          
69
 Sections 3ZB, 3ZC and 3a, despite the above comments about the associated penalties. 
70
 Sentencing Council, 2008. (n51) at p 1. 
71
 Sentencing Council, 2008. (n51) at p 2. 
72
 Roberts, J., Hough, M., Jacobson, J., Moon, N., and Bredee, A., 2008. Attitudes to the sentencing of offences involving 
death by driving. Sentencing Advisory Panel, Research Report-5. [pdf] Available at: 
http://www.icpr.org.uk/media/10375/Attitudes%20to%20sentencing%20of%20Death%20Driving%20offences.pdf [Accessed 
16 March 2018]. 
73
 Ibid, at p 6. 
74
 Ibid, at p 1. 
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3.2 Culpability and causation 
As suggested above, assessments of culpability pertain to the constituent elements of the 
offence, most obviously the mens rea of the offence, but also causation, which is a 
constituent element of all result crimes. For Cooper, in all homicide offences, questions of 
culpability and blameworthiness are inevitably mixed up with the concept of causation, and 
homicide caused by driving offences should not invite a different treatment of the legal 
concept of causation.75  
 
Cooper identifies the culpable act in question as the flawed standard of driving itself; the 
death in question flows directly from the conduct. The difficulty is determining the extent to 
which the outcome of death can fairly be attributed to the bad driving. As with causation 
generally, both legal and factual causation must be present. Factual causation is for the jury 
to assess on the basis of the individual circumstances; what feels fair. The conduct in 
question does not have to be the sole cause of the death, but it must be significant. 
Generally, this is not a legal concept which can be applied with consistency and precision 
and as such, road traffic cases will not offer certainty over the concept of legal causation 
either. 
 
Therefore, it seems that any discussion of culpability invariably demands an assessment of 
individual factors of each case before the court. 
 
3.3 Culpability and character 
Berman discusses the fact that sentencing considerations are divided into offence conduct 
(such as the harm caused) and offender characteristics (such as their personal 
circumstances and previous convictions).76 He discusses this in the context of Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in the US, arguing that these guidelines, along with mandatory 
VHQWHQFLQJVWDWXWHVKDYHHPSKDVLVHGFRQGXFWDQGOLPLWHGMXGJHV¶RSSRUWXQLW\WRFRQVLGHU
offender characteristics - something he links to the strong desire for uniformity of decision-
making and consistency in sentencing practices.77 For him, sentencing judges have a 
                                                          
75
 Cooper, S., 2012. Culpable Driving and Issues of Causation. 76 Journal of Criminal Law 431. 
76
 Berman, D.A., 2005. Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reform. 58(1) 
Stanford Law Review 272. 
77
 Ibid, at p.281. 
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³XQLTXHDQGXQLTXHO\LPSRUWDQWFDVH-VSHFLILFSHUVSHFWLYH´RQWKHUHDOSHUVRQVZKRDFWXDOO\
FRPPLWRIIHQFHVDQGWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIFKDUDFWHU´78  
 
Tata develops the point about the inescapable inter-relationship of offence and offender 
LQIRUPDWLRQ+HDUJXHVWKDWZKLOHDVKDUSGLYLVLRQEHWZHHQµRIIHQFH¶DQGµRIIHQGHU¶
characteristics makes sense in abstract analysis, close empirical observation of the reality of 
decision-PDNLQJGHVWDELOLVHVWKLVVLPSOHELQDU\VHSDUDWLRQ³µ2IIHQFH¶DQGµRIIHQGHU¶
information may be notionally and legally distinct, but interpretively they operate 
V\QHUJLVWLFDOO\FRQVWLWXWLQJµW\SLILHGZKROH-FDVHVWRULHV¶´5DWKHUWKDQVHHLQJVXFKFRQWextual 
inter-relationship as problematic, Tata suggests that the empirical reality, (which sentencing 
shares with other areas of discretionary decision-making), instead raises questions for the 
efficacy of policy. An implication is that the production of reform instruments, such as 
guidelines, could employ case vignettes or scenarios. This would also enable multi-offence 
cases to be addressed in a more meaningful, holistic way, rather than imagined only as an 
aggregation of separate, discrete individual pieces of information, as is common in guideline 
methodologies to-date. Such a holistic vignette or scenario method could complement, and 
be more intuitively meaningful to sentencers than, abstracted two-dimensional offence-
offender methodologies79.  
 
Certainly, under Scots Law, sentencing does afford a unique assessment of character. 
Generally speaking, sections 10180 and 16681 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
SURKLELWWKHDFFXVHG¶VSUHYLRXVFRQYLFWLRQVIURPEHLQJSXWWRWKHFRXUWSULRUWRDFKDUJH
being proved. The main rationale for this is to protect the accused from prejudice.82 As with 
most rules of evidence, this rule is subject to a number of exceptions, one being where 
evidence of previous convictions will be required to support a substantive charge.83 This 
would have application in the context of a section 3ZC offence, where the allegation pertains 
                                                          
78
 Ibid, at p.291. 
79
 Tata, C., 2007. Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the Discretionary Decision Process. 16 Social 
& Legal Studies 425.; see also Tata, 1997. (n30). 
80
 S 101(1) pertains to solemn procedure. 
81
 S 166(3) pertains to summary procedure. 
82
 Lewry v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 62. 
83
 101(2) (solemn cases) and 166B(1) (summary cases). 
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to conduct carried out whilst already disqualified from driving. Therefore, the existence of a 
previous conviction(s) which led to disqualification are part of the substantive charge itself.  
 
Where no exceptions exist, it is only at the sentencing stage that previous convictions can be 
known to the court. 
 
3.4 Reducing culpability through mitigating factors  
As suggested, the Sentencing Council for England and Wales link other factors to culpability. 
Culpability is increased by consuming drugs on alcohol on the basis that this is akin to 
deliberate behaviour by the offender (regardless of the actual manner of the driving 
involved). However, culpability will be lessened if it is recognised that the harm has been 
caused as a result of something like misjudging speed or having restricted visibility. 
Likewise, where there exists a close or family relationship with the victim, the degree of 
mitigation offerHGE\WKLVLVOLQNHGWRWKHRIIHQGHU¶VFXOSDELOLW\LIWKHLUFXOSDELOLW\LVKLJKWKLV
mitigation will have less effect.  
The position advanced by the Sentencing Council for England and Wales is that any 
UHFRJQLVHGPLWLJDWLRQPD\ORZHUWKHRIIHQGHU¶VFXOSDbility. This will be considered in relation 
to more specific factors below. 
 
3.4.1 Impact on the offender 
Scottish sentencing decisions appear to be in keeping with the Sentencing Council for 
(QJODQGDQG:DOHV¶VDSSURDFKRIYLHZLQJWKHLPSDFWRQWKHRIIHQGer as a potentially 
PLWLJDWLQJIDFWRU:LWKLQWKH6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLO¶VJXLGHOLQHVHIIHFWRQWKHRIIHQGHULV
classified as being either physical (serious injury being caused to the offender), or, emotional 
within a limited capacity (having a close relationship with the person or people killed).84 
However, some examples which the courts must consider clearly go beyond this binary 
conceptualisation. 
 
$QH[DPSOHLV'U-DPHV1HLO¶VFRQYLFWLRQIRUGHDWKE\GDQJHURXVGULYLQJ,Q'U-DPHV
Neil pled guilty of GHDWKE\GDQJHURXVGULYLQJDQGZDVVHQWHQFHGWRILYH\HDUV¶
imprisonment.85 The circumstances of this involved speeding and overtaking on the wrong 
                                                          
84
 Sentencing Council, 2008. (n51) at p 5 para 22 and 23. 
85
 The Herald, 2003. Consultant who killed two in crash is jailed. Doctor feared he was having a breakdown. Available at: < 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/11906600.Consultant_who_killed_two_in_crash_is_jailed_Doctor_feared_he_was_ha
ving_breakdown/> [Access 16 March 2018]. 
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side of the road, which resulted in the death of two teenagers.86 1HLO¶VSURIHVVLRQDO
contributions to society were not considered enough to outweigh the danger he was held to 
pose to the public during initial sentencing, but did influence the court during an application 
for the early return of his licence. Neil successfully argued for this early return on the basis 
that as a consultant anaesthetist he had to be able to provide services. Interestingly, Neil 
had been allowed to continue practising as a doctor, despite receiving a custodial 
sentence.87  
 
Elsewhere, the case Noche involves a discussion of factors which are not immediately 
identifiable in the Sentencing Council for England and Wales.88 Here, in the context of death 
by dangerous driving, the original sentence was a period of community service. This had 
taken into account the fact that the driver was a Spanish national who had been working in 
Scotland during the time of the fatality and the fact that the only factor implying culpability 
was his being on the wrong side of the road following a turn in the road. This was 
successfully appealed by the Crown on the basis of undue leniency and, in consequence, 
WKH&RXUWRI&ULPLQDO$SSHDOLPSRVHGDVHQWHQFHRIPRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQWGHVSLWHWKH
fact that the sentencing judge had considered that, as a Spanish national, imprisonment 
would have greater effects for Mr Noche in terms of contact with his family during a custodial 
sentence.  
 
Impact on the offender, therefore, covers a wide spectrum of factors and ones which can 
have wide implications in terms of the overall assessment of culpability. Given this, the 
individual nature of the decision-making must be recognised.  
 
The theoretical basis for understanding the impact to the offender has been considered in 
DFDGHPLFOLWHUDWXUH:DVLNXVHVWKH6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLOIRU(QJODQGDQG:DOHV¶VLQFOXVLRQRI
trauma or loss as mitigating in youth sentencing as a starting point to discuss the role of 
bereavement as a mitigating factor more generally, since for him, this is often overlooked as 
                                                          
86
 BBC News, 2007. Crash driver wins licence fight. Available at: < 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/south_of_scotland/6686959.stm> [Access 8 March 2018]. 
87
 It would appear that the General Medical Council may remove information on disciplinary proceedings after a period of 
WHQ\HDUVZKLFKPHDQVWKDWQRIXUWKHULQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHQDWXUHRIWKH*0&¶VGHFLVLRQPDNLQJRYHUWKLVPDWWHUFRXOGEH
accessed.  
88
 HM Advocate v Noche, 2012 S.C.L. 329. 
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an object of inquiry.89 He recognises what is suggested above: that mitigation relating to the 
immediate circumstances of the offence is based upon reduced culpability. He notes that this 
often involves the application of partial defences (to murder), but that mitigation can also be 
based on sympathy and mercy, as seen in the context of death by driving offences and the 
sentencing guidelines which surround these offences. Wasik suggests that the rationale 
behind this categorisation is not entirely clear. He recognises that the bereavement of a 
loved one/someone close is treated as separate from the issue of remorse and refers to 
Walker, who has previously commented that when there is compassion for the offender, but 
no precise reason for reducing the severity of the sentence, then this can be viewed as 
mercy.90 
 
3.4.2 Personal mitigation  
Perhaps this is also where the effect of remorse can be placed. As suggested above, 
remorse is considered by the Sentencing Council for England and Wales as personal 
mitigation and certainly, the approach of the Scottish courts has been to recognise remorse 
as a factor which can impact upon sentencing, not just in the context of death by driving but 
across all criminal cases. The question of whether remorse should affect the sentencing of 
an offender is one which has been at the heart of a number of legal philoVRSKHUV¶ZRUN 
 
Recently, Maslen has discussed this issue in depth, outlining five arguments which justify 
mitigating a sentence on the grounds of desert: the changed person argument, the reduced 
harm argument, the already punished argument (where remorse is viewed as self-imposed 
punishment), the responsive censure argument (where mitigation is the proper response to 
WKHRIIHQGHU¶VFRPPXQLFDWLRQRIJHQXLQHUHPRUVHDQGWKHPHUFLIXOFRPSDVVLRQDUJXPHQW91 
For Maslen, the responsive censure argument permits the widest application of remorse-
based mitigation, but there also exists consequentialist grounds for limiting the mitigatory 
role of remorse.  
 
3DGILHOGZKLOVWUHFRJQLVLQJWKHPHULWVRI0DVOHQ¶VWKHRUHWLFDODFFRXQWVXOWLPDWHO\TXHVWLRQV
how this understanding can offer assistance to the lawyer in practice. Padfield notes that 
                                                          
89
 Wasik, M., 2018. Bereavement as a mitigating factor. 4 Criminal Law Review 278. 
90
 Walker, N., 1999. Aggravation, Mitigation and Mercy in English Criminal Justice. Oxford: Blackstone. at p 132. 
91
 See for example, Maslen, H., 2015. Remorse, Penal Theory and Sentencing. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
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remorse or an apology can assuage the fear and guilt of both the victim and the community 
in which an offender occurs.92 
 
At the level of practical understanding, remorse has been dHVFULEHGDV³FRPSOH[EOHQGRI
HPRWLRQDQGFRJQLWLRQ´93 It involves an acceptance of personal responsibility and for Padfield 
is not incompatible with slipping back into crime in the future or with previous convictions94. 
Zhong acknowledges that empirical work on remorse is less prevalent than theoretical work, 
but that the empirical studies which do exist point to the fact that remorse does have an 
impact on perceptions and judgements about an individual.95  
 
,QWHUHVWLQJO\KRZHYHULQ=KRQJ¶VVWXG\ZKLOVWMXdges recognised the significance of 
remorse in terms of sentencing, they also acknowledged their own difficulty in assessing 
genuine remorse and the fact that there may be a place for forensic psychiatric experts to 
play in assisting with this. Murphy also recognises this, arguing that is poses particular 
practical problems for offering credit (through a sentencing discount) for the expression of 
remorse.96 For him, if remorse is to be considered, it should be at a later stage, such as 
parole, when enough time has elapsed to provide reliable evidence of remorse.97 This, 
however, does not assist when the sentencing judge must make a decision as to whether a 
prison sentence should be administered or whether alternative means of disposal is 
appropriate in the circumstances.  
 
In his examination of a range of domestic and international settings98, Weisman argues that 
the showing of remorse is often a, even the, most critical feature in the ways punishment is 
thought to be deserved. Acknowledging the difficulties of distinguishing between sincere or 
genuine remorse and that which may be less so, Weisman shows that the demonstration of 
                                                          
92
 Padfiled, N., 2015. Publication Review. 74(3) Cambridge Law Journal 627. 
93
 Zhong, R., 2013. 6R<RX¶UH6RUU\"7KH5ROHRI5HPRUVHLQ&ULPLQDO/DZ. Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library. at p 1. 
[pdf] Available at:  <https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1852&context=ymtdl > [Accessed 23 
March 2018]. 
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 Padfield, 2015. (n92). 
95
 Zhong, 2013. (n93) at pp 8-9. 
96
 Murphy, J.G., 2006. Well Excuse Me- Remorse, Apology and Criminal Sentencing. 38 Arizona State Law Journal 371. at 
379. 
97
 Ibid, at p. 382. 
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 Weisman, R., 2014. Showing Remorse: Law and the Social Control of Emotion. New York: Routledge 
 Causing death by driving offences 
Literature review 
 
 
Page 27 of 43 
convincing signs of remorse is what legal professionals, including judicial sentencers, as well 
as the wider community, tend to look for. More broadly, it is the attitude of the person 
(including remorse) to his or her offending which is, he argues, the central organising lens 
through which judgements about the seriousness of the case as a whole appear to be 
interpreted. This in turn raises the question of the practical feasibility of a sharp distinction 
EHWZHHQµRIIHQFH¶DVRSSRVHGWRµRIIHQGHU¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFV 
 
3.4.3 Apology and Restorative Justice 
Closely linked to the issue of remorse is that of apology.99 As a concept this has perhaps 
been most developed in the context of restorative justice practices, if not necessarily a 
defining feature.  
 
Restorative Justice (RJ) brings into two-way communication, in a safe way, those affected by 
a criminal offence.100  RJ is a victim-sensitive approach oriented towards repairing, as far as 
possible, the harm caused by crime or other transgressions. A core element of Restorative 
Justice is active participation by the victim, the offender and possibly other parties (the 
community).101 0DUVKDOOVWDWHVµRestorative justice is a process whereby all parties with a 
stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
DIWHUPDWKRIWKHRIIHQFHDQGLWVLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHIXWXUH¶102 Central to the value of RJ is 
that it is voluntary for all the key participants. RJ does not require apology (though it may 
often ensue), nor forgiveness by the persons harmed, nor should its efficacy be based on 
whether or not it reduces reoffending (though there is some evidence that it can). 
³5Hstorative justice should be thought of as a process that will be helpful to many people 
KDUPHGDQGVKRXOGEHDVVHVVHGRQWKDWEDVLV´103 Further, most scholars of RJ argue that it 
is best seen as a supplement to the formal criminal justice process, rather than seeking to 
                                                          
99
 Although Murphy argues that an apology is something quite different from remorse and repentance. For him, remorse is 
an internal state and repentance is an internal mental act. Both are aspects of character that have external manifestations 
but are not external. Murphy, 2006. (n96) at p. 383. 
100
 Shapland, J., 2017. Restorative Justice; the research evidence and implications for Scotland. 5(1) Scottish Justice 
Matters 4. 
101
 European Forum on Restorative Justice. Available at: <www.euforumrj.org/about-the-forum/restorative-justice/ > 
[Accessed 23 April 2018]. 
102
 Marshall T., 1999. Restorative justice: an overview. Research Development and Statistics  Directorate: Home Office. 
[pdf] Available at:  <http://www.antoniocasella.eu/restorative/Marshall_1999-b.pdf > [Accessed 23 April 2018]. 
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UHSODFHLW7KH6FRWWLVK6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLO¶V'UDIW6HQWHQFLQJ*XLGHOLQHRQµ3ULQFLSOHVDQG
3XUSRVHVRI6HQWHQFLQJ¶QRWHVDWGWKDWSXUSRVHVPD\LQFOXGH 
 
³*LYLQJWKHRIIHQGHUWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRPDNHDPHQGV6HQWHQFLQJDFNQRZOHGJHVWKHKDUP 
caused to victims and/or communities. Sentencing may also aim to recognise and meet the 
needs of victims and/or communities by requiring the offender to repair at least some of the 
harms caused; this may be with the co-RSHUDWLRQRIWKRVHDIIHFWHG´104 
 
One question which is sometimes raised is whether, if it is voluntary, people wish to take part 
in RJ. In their evaluation of three schemes which ran in different parts of England and at 
different stages of criminal justice (pre-release from custody, during community justice 
sentences, pre-sentence and as diversion from prosecution, with both adult and young 
offenders), Shapland et al found that between 36 per cent and 83 per cent of victims wanted 
to take part. The rate depended on the time since the offence and its nature. When delivered 
as mediation or conferencing with well-trained facilitators, the RJ events ran smoothly, even 
though many of these were for serious violence, robbery or burglary. Many persons harmed 
(victims/survivors) appreciated that the offender was willing to face them and to answer the 
NH\TXHVWLRQVZKLFKYLFWLPVIDFHHJµ:K\GLG\RXGRLW"¶µ:K\PH"¶µ:KDWGLG\RXGRZLWK
WKHPRQH\"¶µ+RZGR\RXIHHOQRZDERXWZKDW\RXGLG"¶HWF,QJHQHUDOYLFWLPVVXUYLYRUVGLG
not want direct reparation from the offender (money or work for them) but they did want the 
offender to try to turn his or her life around by taking definite steps to resolve underlying 
GULYHUVRIRIIHQGLQJ³9LFWLPVIRXQGWKHSURFHVVSURGXFHGPRUHFORVXUHIRUWKHPZLWKYLFWLms 
of more serious offences finding restorative justice even more helpful than those victimised 
E\OHVVVHULRXVRIIHQFHV´105  
 
Whyte and Kearney discuss the development of restorative practices in Scotland, which they 
say sympathise with the Scottish tradition of assythment- traditionally where the family of a 
                                                          
104
 Scottish Sentencing Council, 2017. Principles and Purposes of Sentencing: Draft Sentencing Guideline. [pdf] Available 
at:  <https://www.scottishsentencingcouncil.org.uk/media/1505/principles-and-purposes-of-sentencing-draft-sentencing-
guideline.pdf> [Accessed 29 April 2018]. 
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 Kirkwood and Munro, 2017. (n103); Shapland, 2017. (n100); Shapland, J., Robinson, G., and Sorsby, A., 2011. 
Restorative justice in  
practice. Abingdon: Routledge. See also the video of Professor Shapland¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQDERXWWKHSURVSHFWVRI5MLQ
Scotland available at: <http://www.scottishinsight.ac.uk/Programmes/Learningfromotherplaces/RestorativeJustice.aspx> > 
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person harmed could seek damages.106 Their recent article focuses on the Restoration in 
serious crime (RiSC) initiative, developed at the University of Edinburgh between 2012 and 
2016. This initiative aimed to develop a model for crime particularly where parties involved in 
the offence were known to each other. Initially the case studies used by RiSC involved death 
by driving offences where the deceased and the driver were known to one another. During 
the recent Restorative Justice in Scotland Dialogues HYHQWµ'RHVUHVWRUDWLYHMXVWLFHKDYHD
UROHWRSOD\LQKRPLFLGH"¶:K\WHHODERUDWHGRQRQHRIWKHVHFDVHVWXGLHVDPRWKHU¶V
experiences of her son being killed by a driver who failed to stop at the scene of the offence. 
This case involved a conviction for culpable homicide (perjury and failing to stop) rather than 
a conviction under the Road Traffic Act, but importantly the mother emphasised her need to 
KHDUWKHRIIHQGHU¶VYRLFHZKLFKZDVVLOHQFHGGXULQJWhe court process. Despite this silence 
in the formal setting of the court, the offender himself communicated his desire to apologise 
WRKLVYLFWLP¶VIDPLO\WKURXJKWKLUGSDUWLHV- something that was hugely significant for all those 
involved in the process.107  
 
5HIHUULQJWRWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VDQQXDOVWDWLVWLFVRQURDGGHDWKV:K\WHDQG.HDUQH\
point to a further limitation of Government data: that no information is provided about 
whether or not parties involved (victims and deceased) are known to one other. Using figures 
on sudden death/suicide as a proxy, they estimate that between six and 60 people are 
directly affected by each death which occurs.108 They comment that in their first case study 
³DPDMRUIRFXVEHFDPHWKHZLGHUVRFLDOQHWZRUNRIERWKWKHGHceased victim and the 
convicted person. Mothers emerged as important motivators in the ripple of change effected 
E\WKHZRUN´ZKLOVWLQWKHVHFRQGFDVHVWXG\WKHUHH[LVWHGDGHHSURRWHGQHHGE\WKH
YLFWLP¶VPRWKHUWRKHDUDQ\DSRORJ\EHLQJRIIHUHG109 
 
Whilst many RJ practices operate separately from the criminal justice process, evidence 
VXJJHVWVWKDWDSRORJLHVLQWKLVFRQWH[WKDYHDVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWRQYLFWLPV¶IDPLOLHV
Certainly this is the position that is accepted by Bibas and Bierschbach, who cite empirical 
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<https://www.scottishinsight.ac.uk/ProgrammeEventPages/RestorativeJustice/Dialogue4/tabid/6360/Default.aspx> 
[Accessed 13 April 2018]. 
108
 Whyte and Kearney, 2017. (n106) at p.12. 
109
 Ibid. 
 Causing death by driving offences 
Literature review 
 
 
Page 30 of 43 
research carried out by Poulson which confirms that remorse and apologies matter 
immensely to victims.110 This study suggested that 74 per cent of offenders will apologise in 
restorative justice conferences but that when the only opportunity to apologise exists in the 
court room, 71 per cent of offenders would not apologise.111 For Bibas and Bierschback it is 
LQWKHFULPLQDODUHQDZKHUHYLFWLPV¶ZRXQGDUHWKHGHHSHVWWKDWUHPRUVHDQGDSRORJ\KDV
the most significance and that although sentencing is the one place where remorse and 
apology do play a role, the sentencing stage is not especially well structured in terms of 
promoting it.112 7KH\UHFRJQLVHWKDWµFRPPRGLI\LQJ¶DQDSRORJ\FDQVXEYHUWDQGFKHDSHQLW
They also recognise that it can be difficult to measure sincerity. They argue, however, that 
discerning sincerity and honesty is the role that judges are tasked with and expert at, leaving 
them better placed for such assessment. Yet despite this, even insincere apologies are 
better than none at all since the wrong of the offence is publicly highlighted and over time it 
may ultimately promote genuine repentance from the offender. More than this, it can 
potentially vindicate victims whilst reinforcing social norms.113 Murphy echoes this opinion to 
some extent, commenting that some victims will not care whether the apology offered is 
sincere (since there is a publically humiliating aspect to having to apologise). However, he 
does question whether the degree of community which exists in reality is overstated amongst 
those who prioritise offers of remorse and apology in the criminal setting.114 
 
Addressing these and other concerns, the Scottish Government, in accordance with section 
of the Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014, recently produced fairly detailed guidance 
on the delivery of Restorative Justice in Scotland in accordance with section 5 of the so that 
ZKHUH5-LVDYDLODEOHLWLV³GHOLYHUHGLQDFRKHUHQWFRQVLVWHQWYLFWLP-focused manner across 
6FRWODQGDQGDUHLQOLQHZLWKWKH(89LFWLPV¶5LJKWV'LUHFWLYH´115  
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4.0 Public perception of sentencing 
Before examining death by driving cases specifically, the context of public perception 
research should be briefly sketched. In general the public assign a high level of support for 
proportionality in sentencing. However, empirical research across western countries has now 
also established that although public opinion tends to regard sentences in the abstract as too 
lenient, this is in large part, at least, a function of limited public knowledge. Although the 
picture varies partly demographically, in general people tend to over-estimate the 
seriousness of crime (e.g. the prevalence of violence), and under-estimate the sorts of 
sentences passed. When little or no information about the case is provided people tend to 
imagine the gravest offences carried out by the most culpable offenders, When people are 
DVNHGHJLQRSLQLRQSROOVWRJLYHWKHLUµWRS-of-the-KHDG¶UHVSRQVHVWRDEVWUDFWTXHVWLRQV
about crime and justice they may tend to rely on images of the most serious of offending, 
which is most prominently reported in the media, often because of their seemingly lenient 
treatment. Thus, the widespread view that sentencing is too lenient appears to be based on 
a widespread under-estimate of the reality of sentencing practices.  
 
When, however, people are given vignettes of different cases, research tends to find that the 
sentences people suggest sentences tend to be less disparate from that which the courts do 
pass. This phenomenon has been repeatedly found in research across the western world.116 
That said, the picture is nuanced, complex and contingent on context and methodology, 
invoking wider feelings of insecurity about contemporary life. Thus, it may be too simplistic to 
simply dismiss this as no more than a problem of public ignorance or populism which can be 
corrected only by a top-down strategy of mass public education.117 
 
Arguably, informed public attitudes should be a consideration when drafting sentencing 
guidelines to cases where driving causes death, since such cases give rise to a great deal of 
community concern.118 As such, this will be considered in more detail below. 
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4.1 Culpability and public perception 
In 2008, Roberts et al conducted research in England and Wales which explored public 
reaction to the four offences under the Road Traffic Act 1988: causing death by dangerous 
driving, death by careless driving, causing death by careless driving whilst under the 
influence of drink or drugs, causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving, and causing 
death by driving when driving without a licence, insurance or whilst disqualified.119. 
Examining attitudes towards culpability was a key part of this research. A difference in 
attitude could be seen between survey results and those obtained from focus groups.120 
Emphasising culpability was also noted to increase punitive feeling amongst participants.  
 
5REHUWVHWDOUHFRJQLVHGWKDWZKLOVWWKHµVSRQWDQHRXV¶UHDFWLRQWRWKHVHRIIHQFHVDUHXVXDOO\
punitive, this does not accurately reflect the state of public attitudes, especially when people 
are given specific case information. Their research used both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. The survey employed a representative sample of 1,031 adults in England and 
Wales, examining perceptions of seriousness and opinions about appropriate punishments. 
Questions were posed about six case vignettes. In addition, 23 focus groups with 101 
participants were conducted and concluded that the limits of public tolerance for sentencing 
in these cases is broader than would be imagined after taking a simple poll question. Their 
report for the Sentencing Advisory Panel emphasised this from the outset: the public 
underestimate sentencing.121  
 
While there has been no in-depth research into public attitudes and knowledge of death by 
driving offences in Scotland, research in other jurisdictions has quite recently been 
undertaken, most notably by Roberts et al in England and Wales.122 Broadly speaking, the 
research found that, in common with research into attitudes about crime in general, when 
asked in the abstract, people considered sentencing for causing death by driving far too 
lenient. Crucially, however, people tended to under-estimate very significantly the severity of 
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FXUUHQWVHQWHQFLQJSUDFWLFHV7KHUHVHDUFKIRXQG³DYHU\ZLGHJXOI´EHWZHHQWKHVHQWHQFHV
ZKLFKSHRSOHEHOLHYHWKHFRXUWVSDVV)RUWKHµGDQJHURXV¶RIIHQFHWKHSXEOLFIDYRXUHGD
custody rate of 71 per cent but expected a custody rate from the courts of just 31 per cent, In 
UHDOLW\LWZDVSHUFHQW6LPLODUO\IRUµcareless-GUXQNRIIHQFHV¶WKHGLVFUHSDQF\ZDVQHDUO\
as large: the public favoured a custody rate of 76 per cent but expected a custody rate from 
the courts of just 41 per cent. In reality, it was 94 per cent. This suggests that not only do 
people greatly underestimate the realities of sentencing practices (at least in England and 
Wales), but that, in general, preferred sentences may, in fact, be slightly less severe than the 
practices of the courts.123  
 
That said, there is an important exception in relation to causing death when unlicensed, 
GLVTXDOLILHGRUXQLQVXUHG7KHUHVHDUFKLQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHVIRXQGWKDW³WKHSRVLWLRQLQ
UHODWLRQWRWKHLVERWKVWDUNHUDQGPRUHFRPSOLFDWHG«>3@HRSOHUDWHWKHGLVTXDOLILHGRIIHQFH
DVPRUHVHULRXVWKDQµFDUHOHVV¶GULYLQJ´124 The premediated aspect of the offender having 
knowing that s/he should not be driving was linked to an increase in perceived culpability. 
Causing death whilst under the influence of drink or drugs produced the strongest reaction 
from participants in RoEHUWHWDO¶VVWXG\DQGZDVFRQVLGHUHGFRPSDUDEOHWRPXUGHUVRIRU
them for anomalous in their study of public perception to sentencing in this context.125 This, 
Roberts et al note, is a situation which is complicated for the drafters of guidelines in that 
Parliament appears, in setting the relative sentencing maxima, to have treated, for example, 
WKHµGLVTXDOLILHG¶RIIHQFHDVOHVVVHULRXVWKDQWKHµFDUHOHVV¶RQH126  Participants in Robert et 
DO¶VVWXG\FRQVLGHUHGWKLVWREHPRUHVHULRXVWKDQFDUHOHVVGULYLQJ despite the fact that it is 
formally treated as less serious than careless driving.  
 
For Roberts et al, public education would be beneficial in this area since their evaluation of 
views were conducted after further information was provided to participants. They leave 
open the question of what is considered an acceptable gap between public opinion and 
practice.127  
                                                          
123
  5REHUWVHWDOQ+RZHYHUWKHµUHDO¶VHQWHQFHVUHO\RQRIILFLDOGDWDDQGJLYHQLWVOLPLWDWLRQVQRWHGDERYHZH
should be cautious about drawing such conclusions.  
124
 Roberts et al, 2008. (n119) at p. 536. 
125
 Roberts et al, 2008. (n120). 
126
 Ibid. 
127
 Ibid. 
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Roberts et al comment that in the context of causing death by driving offences, a more 
restricted scope exists for sentencing factors, especially mitigation, when compared with 
public perception on the sentencing of other offences such as burglary.128Aggravating factors 
were deemed to be more influential than mitigating factors in terms of attitudes towards 
sentencing. However, what amounted to an aggravation or mitigating was not mutually 
exclusionary. For example, remorse was considered by participants in this study to be mild 
mitigation, but when absent, this was considered a significant aggravation. Conversely, 
whilst fleeing after the offence was considered an aggravation, helping was not considered a 
strong mitigation. Instead this was treated with neutrality given the view that offering 
assistance in the aftermath of a crime was simply the right thing to do and something that the 
offender should have been doing anyway.  
 
Participants were also highly influenced by the absence of prior driving offences, and 
offenders were considered to be more culpable if they had not learnt from previous mistakes. 
Youth was given little weight by focus groups but the issue of having a close relationship with 
the deceased (and especially being related to them) proved a more difficult subject of 
discussion for participants involved. Most concluded, however, that this should have no 
impact upon the penalty since a death had still been caused and it was the death which was 
EHLQJSXQLVKHG/LWWOHV\PSDWK\ZDVJLYHQIRUWKHRIIHQGHU¶VUHPRUVHRQWKHEDVLVWKDWLWZDV
¶WRRODWH¶DQGLQFRQVHTXHQWLDO6LPLODUO\LQMXU\FDXVHGWRWKHRIIHQGHUZDVWUHDWHGZLWKOLWWOH
sympathy, viewed as self-inflicted.  
 
Focus groups saw little role for beavered relatives. The common consensus seemed to be 
WKDWUHODWLYHVFRXOGQHYHUEHUDWLRQDOLQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV5REHUWVHWDO¶VVWXG\UHVHDUFK
LQFOXGHGLQWHUYLHZVZLWKYLFWLPV¶UHODWLYHVZKo perhaps unsurprisingly, did express 
dissatisfaction about sentencing including disqualification period. Their views on what 
constituted mitigation also differed from other participants in the study. A further source of 
GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQIRUWKHYLFWLPV¶UHlatives was the impersonality and routine nature of court 
proceedings.  
 
 
                                                          
128
 Roberts, J., Hough, M., Jacobson, J., Moon, N., and Steel, N., 2009. Public Attitudes to the Principles of Sentencing. 
Research Report-6, Sentencing Advisory Panel. [pdf] Available at: 
<http://www.icpr.org.uk/media/10369/Attitudes%20to%20principles%20of%20sentencing.pdf> [Accessed 16 March 2018]. 
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4.2 Personal mitigation and public perception 
/RYHJURYHKDVDOVRFRQVLGHUHGWKHSXEOLF¶VVHQVHRIMXVWLFHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIGHDWKE\
driving, particularly in relation to their views on personal mitigation. For him, the 
SURSRUWLRQDOLW\SULQFLSOHIUDPHVWKH$XVWUDOLDQ6HQWHQFLQJ*XLGHOLQHV&RXQFLO¶VVWDWHPHQWRQ
the decision-making to be followed by sentencing judges. As such, he examines how 
$QGUHZYRQ+LUVFK¶VSURSRUWLRQDOLW\WKHRU\Xnderstands personal mitigation in sentencing, 
how it can be applied in an empirical study and as such, whether this theory is consistent 
ZLWKWKHSXEOLF¶VVHQVHRIMXVWLFH129  
 
8QGHU/RYHJURYH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHSURSRUWLRQDOLW\WKHRU\WKHUHDUHIRXUFDtegories for 
personal mitigation: reduced culpability (where defences, for example provocation, or 
foreseeability may be relevant), the absence of prior convictions, equity mitigation (where 
FRPSDVVLRQLVRIIHUHGIRURIIHQGHU¶VVXIIHULQJDQGWKHDFNQRZOHGJement of their 
wrongfulness by way of remorse or an apology) and equality of impact (where some 
offenders will be more affected by punishment than others, such as young offenders). 
)ROORZLQJIURP/RYHJURYH¶VHPSLULFDOVWXG\LQYROYLQJSDUWLFLSDQWVKHFoncludes that the 
³SXEOLFGRQRWYLHZSHUVRQDOPLWLJDWLRQWKRXJKDSURSRUWLRQDOLVW¶VH\HV´130. Instead, there is 
more to their sense of justice than proportionality of punishment.  
 
4.3 Public opinion as a source law reform 
Cunningham discusses the fact that the Road Safety Act 2006, which introduced sections 2B 
and 3ZB into the Road Traffic Act 1988 was influenced by campaigns from families of those 
killed as a result of driving offences.131  Despite this, fears that causing death by dangerous 
driving would be µGRZQJUDGHGWR¶FDXVLQJGHDWKE\FDUHOHVVGULYLQJXSRQLWVLQWURGXFWLRQDQG
as such, section 2B muddies the waters in borderline cases which might have been 
otherwise charged under section 1.132 Her research found such claims to be overstated. 
Prosecutors interviewed in her study were of the view that it was not so much the distinction 
between dangerous and careless driving which poses them a problem, but instead the 
                                                          
129
 /RYHJURYH$3URSRUWLRQDOLW\WKHRU\SHUVRQDOPLWLJDWLRQDQGSHRSOH¶VVHQVHRIMXVWLFHCambridge Law 
Journal 321. 
130
 Ibid, at p 344. 
131
 Cunningham., 2015. (n22). 
132
 A view espoused by Hirst, M., 2008. Causing death by driving and other offences: a question of balance. 5(1) Criminal 
Law Review 399. 
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decision whether or not to prosecute at the bottom end of the scale. For example, cases 
which involve momentary inattention. Despite this conclusion, Cunningham recognises that 
there have been occasional cases prosecuted under section 2B, where section 1 would have 
been the more appropriate charge. Cunningham also recognises that many cases will fall 
short of bereaved families expectation in terms of sentencing, but if their expectations can be 
managed, they are made to feel as though their case matters and their loss officially 
recognised, then the offences introduced by the Road Safety Act 2006 affords clear benefits 
for families.  
 
&HUWDLQO\LQ5REHUWVHWDO¶VVWXG\DOORIWKHLQWHUYLHZVFRQGXFWHGZLWKFORVHUHODWLYHVRI
the victim showed there to be a deep dissatisfaction at the sentence passed.133 Their 
perceptions were that sentences were lenient, with the typical descriptors reported as 
³GLVJXVWLQJ´³DQLQVXOW´DQG³WRWDOGLVJUDFH´134 In particular, anger and incomprehension was 
expressed at the fact that the offender would be expected to serve half, or less than half, of 
the period in custody, after which the offender would be able to return to their normal life, 
despite the fact that their lives had been irrevocably changed. These feelings appeared to be 
aggravated by experiences of immersion in a confusing and alienating court environment 
and wider criminal justice system. Fury at the offender was intensified by a feeling that s/he 
had shown no remorse and would not be required to pay properly for the harm caused.  The 
sense of a lack of remorse, and that the offender seemed to be indifferent to the harm done 
and to their suffering, was a central source of anger, to which all relatives returned. Asked if 
it would have make a difference to them if the offender had shown genuine remorse, most 
said that it would have made some difference to how they felt and indeed were looking for 
signs of genuine remorse. That said, they did not believe it should necessarily change the 
sentence.  
 
The wider sense of confusion, marginalisation even alienation from an apparently insensitive 
system was also iPSRUWDQW5REHUWVHWDOVXJJHVWWKDWLQWHUYLHZHHV¶FRPPHQWVDERXW
VHQWHQFHVSDVVHGVXJJHVWWKHUHLVDQHHGIRUFOHDUHUH[SODQDWLRQRIVHQWHQFHVLQFRXUW³7KH
difficulty is that victims listen to the passing of sentence in a state of great emotional 
intensLW\6RPHRIRXULQWHUYLHZHHVVDLGWKH\FRXOGQRWUHPHPEHUDOORIZKDWLVVDLG«´135  
                                                          
133
 Roberts et al, 2008. (n120) at p.52. 
134
 Ibid. 
135
 Ibid, p. 59. 
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5.0 Other commonwealth jurisdictions 
6WRUH\GLVFXVVHVWKHFDWHJRU\RIµXQODZIXODFWPDQVODXJKWHU¶ZKLFKH[LVWVLQ(QJODQG
Australia and Canada.136 Given these and other similarities, the approach taken in Canada 
and Australia will be considered below. Generally, what can be said is that the maximum 
penalty laid down by Parliament in the UK would appear to be analogous to other 
commonwealth jurisdictions, as too would the conceptually different treatment of these types 
of offences.  
 
5.1 Canada 
Canada is a single jurisdiction, with criminal offences being regulated by the Criminal Code. 
The Criminal Code dictates that a sentence must be consistent with the fundamental 
principles and fundamental purpose of sentencing. Section 718 of the Code dictates that the 
fundamental purpose is essentially proportionality of sentencing, as it relates to the 
responsibility of the offender.  
 
5.1.1 Offences and penalties 
The Canadian Criminal CoGHSURYLGHVWKHRIIHQFHRIµGDQJHURXVRSHUDWLRQFDXVLQJGHDWK¶
under section 249(4). The provision includes the fact that the maximum sentence cannot be 
in excess of 14 years.  More relevant in practice are the offences of impaired driving causing 
death (section 255(3)), driving with a blood alcohol unit above 0.08 per cent and causing 
death (section 255(3.1)) and failing or refusing to take a required test without a reasonable 
excuse and causing death (section 255(3.2)). The maximum penalty for each of these is a 
life sentence, any driving prohibition deemed appropriate by the sentencing judge and/or any 
fine the judge deems appropriate. There is no minimum penalty.  
Aggravations and mitigations must be considered during sentencing. Aggravations include: 
thHYLFWLP¶VLQMXULHVLIQRWGHDGSULRUFRQYLFWLRQVWKHIDLOXUHWRVHHNDVVLVWDQFHIRUDGGLFWLRQ
or behavioural problem and not taking responsibility for the offence (but this will not include 
pleading not guilty, instead it relates more to a lack of remorse). Mitigations include: previous 
good character, showing remorse, having aboriginal status, being of young or old age, 
having a mental or physical disability, having financial dependents, pleading guilty. 
 
 
                                                          
136
 Storey, T. 2017. Unlawful and dangerous: a comparative analysis of unlawful act manslaughter in English, Australian 
and Canadian Law. 79(4) Journal of Criminal Law 234. 
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5.1.2 Sentencing 
Statutory sentencing maxima associated with causing death by driving and causing serious 
injury by driving increased in Canada in 1985, 1999, 2000 and 2008.  Despite this, Solomon 
and Perkins-Leitman recognise the fact that maximum sentences are rarely used in Canada, 
with only one case seemingly employing the maximum sentences.137 To further emphasise 
the reluctance to impose maximum sentences, they discuss the case of R v Walsh where the 
offender fled the scene, was twice the legal alcohol limit, had 18 previous convictions related 
to impaired driving (and 96 other criminal convictions) and was recognised as being likely to 
re-RIIHQGEXW\HWZDVQRWGHVLJQDWHGDµGDQJHURXVRIIHQGHU¶DVSHUWKHSURVHFXWRU¶V
application.138 There are also low charge and conviction rates for these crimes. 
 
5HVXOWDQWO\WKLVKDVFDXVHGGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQHVSHFLDOO\DPRQJVWYLFWLPV¶IDPLOLHV2QHKLJK
SURILOHJURXSZKLFKKDVHQDFWHGOHJDOFKDQJHLVµ0RWKHUV$JDLQVW'ULQN'ULYLQJ¶0$'')RU
WKHP³7KHVKRUWVHQWHQFHVLPSRVHGLQVRPHFDVHVRILPSDLUHGGULYLQJFausing death or 
bodily harm, the generous credit given for pre-conviction imprisonment and the fact that 
many of these offenders are paroled after serving only one-third of their sentence has 
JHQHUDWHGFRQWURYHUV\DQGDQJHUHGYLFWLPVRILPSDLUHGGULYLQJ´139    
                      
Some academic commentators have voiced similar concern that the principles underlying the 
ODZLQWKLVDUHDDUH³FRQYROXWHG´OHDYLQJMXGJHVDEOHWR³SLFNDQGFKRRVHDPRQJWKH
principles to justify the sentence that they wish to imSRVH´140, despite the existence of 
sentencing guidelines. However, Solomon and Perkins-Leitman comment that the focus on 
µWRXJKODZV¶ZKLFKRIWHQRULJLQDWHVIURPFDPSDLJQJURXSVREIXVFDWHVWKHODFNRIIRFXVRU
implementation of practical preventative measures, such as breath tests.141 The table below 
show the sanctions for impaired driving causing death cases in Canada for the period 
1994/95 to 2014/15. 
                                                          
137
 Solomon, R., and Perkins-Leitman, D., 2014. Canada Sentencing Law and Impaired Driving. Les Cahiers de PV 28. at p 
3 [pdf] Available at: <http://www.aqpv.ca/images/stories/docs/Solomon_Perkins_mai2014.pdf> [Accessed 23 March 2018]. 
138
 [2009] JQ 9144 (Qc Prov Ct) 
139
 MADD, Sentencing for Impaired Driving, [pdf] Available at: 
<http://www.madd.ca/media/docs/MADD_Canada_Sentencing_Framework_FINAL.pdf> [Accessed 23 March 2018]. MADD 
prompted the elimination of conditional sentences of imprisonment for impaired driving causing death and bodily harm 
which did result in increased prison sentences. 
140
 Solomon, R., and Perkins-Leitman, D., 2014. (n137) at p 9.  
141
 Although it should be noted that Solomon acted as the National Director of Legal Policy for Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving Canada and Perkin-/HLWPDQZDVZRUNLQJDV6RORPRQ¶VUHVHDUFKDVVLVWDQW 
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Table 4: Selected Sanctions for Impaired Driving Causing Death: Canada, 1994/95-
2014/15142 
Year Persons 
convicted 
Custody 
(%) 
Conditional 
sentence (%) 
Probation 
(%) 
Fine 
(%) 
Other 
(%) 
1994/95 29 97 0 41 0 14 
1995/96 42 88 0 52 5 26 
1996/97 47 87 0 43 2 26 
1997/98 49 82 0 45 8 33 
1998/99 55 80 6 39 2 67 
1999/00 42 79 10 33 5 57 
2000/01 51 75 16 33 8 61 
2001/02 41 80 10 34 0 80 
2002/03 42 62 29 40 5 90 
2003/04 50 64 24 22 6 94 
2004/05 58 66 17 31 5 84 
2005/06 45 67 7 22 4 47 
2006/07 56 57 23 27 5 61 
2007/08 61 59 20 33 2 70 
2008/09 60 72 18 23 3 58 
2009/10 54 83 6 20 2 65 
2010/11 48 85 4 25 0 69 
2011/12 35 83 0 26 3 71 
2012/13 48 83 0 21 2 65 
2013/14 40 88 0 18 0 58 
2014/15 31 71 0 10 0 48 
 
 
5.2 Australia 
Australia cannot be talked about as a single jurisdiction. Instead, it comprises of nine 
jurisdictions, six of which are individual states: New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, 
Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania.143  
                                                          
142
 Taken from MADD, 2017. Sentencing For Impaired Driving Causing Death: Canada, 1994/95-2015/16.at p 7. [pdf] 
Available at:< https://madd.ca/pages/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Sentencing-for-Impaired-Driving-Causing-Death-1994-95-
to-2015-16-28Nov-201729.pdf> [Accessed 17 April 2018]. 
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5.2.1 Offences and penalties 
In New South Wales (the biggest jurisdiction) and Western Australia, death by dangerous 
GULYLQJLVGHDOWZLWKE\WKHHTXLYDOHQWRIIHQFHRI³GDQJHURXVGULYLQJRFFDVLRQLQJGHDWK´144. 
The maximum penalty for this offence is ten years imprisonment, but this increases to 14 
years if aggravations are present. Similar to UK jurisdictions, aggravations include alcohol or 
drug impairment.145 Also explicitly mentioned in the statutory definitions provided is where 
the accused has been driving a vehicle to escape pursuit by a police officer. 
 
In South Australia, section 19A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 provides the 
RIIHQFHRIµFDXVLQJGHDWKRUKDUPE\XVHRIYHKLFOHRUYHVVHO¶7KLVLQYROYHVGULYLQJDYHKLFOH
in a culpably negligent manner, recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner dangerous to any 
person, and as such causing death.146 Subsection three of the same provision mirrors this 
offence where the consequences are serious harm rather than death. 
The maximum penalty for a first offence is 15 years imprisonment with mandatory licence 
disqualification for ten years or longer.147 The maximum penalty for a first offence which is an 
aggravated or for a subsequent offence is imprisonment for life and mandatory licence 
disqualification for ten years or longer.148  
 
Aggravations are contained within the Road Traffic Act 1961. These include attempting to 
escape the pursuit of a police officer, being disqualified at the time, being under the influence 
of alcohol above the proscribed level,149 or driving at excessive speed150.  
 
5.2.2 Sentencing 
Government publications confirm that between 2011±12 and 2015±16, 56 people were 
sentenced in the higher courts of Victoria for a principal offence of culpable driving causing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
143
 The remaining jurisdictions are the two Australian Territories within mainland Australia (Northern Australia and Australian 
Capital Territory). Australian Commonwealth Government is the final jurisdiction.  
144
 S 52A Crimes Act 1990.  
145
 S 52A(7) Crimes Act 1990. 
146
 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1985 s 19A (1). 
147
 Ibid, s 19A(1)(a)(i). 
148
 Ibid ,s 19A(1)(a)(ii). 
149
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death.151 Over the same period, it is reported that 46 of the 56 people sentenced for culpable 
driving causing death received a period of imprisonment, with a further three people 
receiving an aggregate sentence of imprisonment.152 
 
The table below shows the principal sentence of imprisonment for culpable driving causing 
death during this five year period. 
 
Table 5: Imprisonment for culpable driving causing death 2011-12 to 2015-16 
Imprisonment length (years) Number of people 
Four- less than five 6 
Five-less than six 18 
Six-less than seven 10 
Seven-less than eight 7 
Eight-less than nine 3 
Nine-less than ten 0 
Ten-less than eleven 2 
 
The data also provides information on other offences finalised at the same hearing, for 
example theft or failing to stop at the scene of the offence. The total effective sentence of 
imprisonment and non-parole periods are also provided in this summary. Total effective 
imprisonment lengths ranged from three years and nine months to 16 years, and non-parole 
periods ranged from one year and six months to 11 years.153  
 
6.0 Conclusions 
Current sentencing practices in Scotland in relation to causing death by driving appear to be 
guided by both current sentencing for culpable homicide convictions and the guidelines 
offered by the Sentencing Council for England and Wales in relation to causing death by 
driving. Broadly speaking, the structure and sentencing of existing offences appears to be 
broadly similar to other comparable jurisdictions. Noting the value of available statistical 
                                                          
151
 Sentencing Advisory Council, 2017. Sentencing Snapshot. Available at: 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/publications/sentencing-snapshots/200-sentencing-trends-culpable-driving-
causing-death-higher-courts> [Accessed 27 March 2018] 
152
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information about causing death by driving offences, this report also notes the limitations of 
such official data, based as they tend to be on a principal conviction, which can obscure 
comparisons between multi-conviction cases.  
 
It has been noted that this category of offences represents specific challenges to sentencing, 
in particular the demands of proportionality. Proportionality in sentencing is normally thought 
to involve an assessment of both harm and culpability. Invariably resulting in extremely high 
degree of harm, such offences are relatively unusual in that they may often, though not 
always, be thought to have involved a relatively low degree of culpability.  
Scotland appears to lack in-depth research about public opinion and attitudes in cases of 
causing death by driving offences. However, based on the available research evidence 
world-wide, public attitudes and knowledge of these cases need to be understood in the 
wider context of how public attitudes are, in part, a function of limited public knowledge about 
VHQWHQFLQJ:KHQDVNHGLQWKHDEVWUDFWDERXWZKHWKHUVHQWHQFLQJLVµWRRWRXJK¶µWRROHQLHQW¶
RUµDERXWULJKW¶WKHYDVWPDMRULW\RISHRSOHUDWHLWDVµWRROHQLHQW¶3HRSOHWHQGWRRYHU-
estimate the seriousness of offences and the significantly under-estimate the severity of 
sentences passed by the courts. When, however, people are given vignettes of different 
cases, research has established that the sentences people suggest sentences which are 
fairly similar to that which the courts pass. Research suggests that relatives of the victims 
harboured very negative feelings about the criminal justice process, which may be intensified 
by not hearing any explanation (in particular remorse) from the offender. It is possible that 
there may be some scope to consider carefully the desirability and feasibility of Restorative 
Justice as a victim-sensitive option which offers, (but in no sense coerces), a means to bring 
into two-way communication, in a safe way, those affected by a criminal offence. This would 
not replace the formal criminal process, but rather be complementary to it.  
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